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PROTECTING THE RETAIL INVESTOR IN AN AGE
OF FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY
Barbara Black*

The year 2008 was a devastating one for all investors as the
financial meltdown wreaked havoc on the world’s economy and left no form
of investment unscathed. In October 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average reached its all-time high of 14,164.53;1 by December 31, 2008, it
had sunk to 8,776.39.2 During the year, U.S. investors experienced:
1. the total failure of the big banks to manage their risk,
particularly their exposure to mortgage-related securities
and other complicated debt obligations;3
2. the federal conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac resulting from their foreclosure losses;4
3. the collapse of giant insurer AIG because of its losses from
credit default swaps (“CDS”);5
4. the freezing of the auction rate securities (“ARS”) market
that left thousands of investors holding illiquid investments
that had been sold to them on the express representation that
they were liquid;6
5. the failure of the money market mutual fund, Reserve
Primary Fund, to maintain a $1 net asset value for its shares
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati
College of Law. This article discusses events as of early July 2009. Thanks to Jerrod Kuhn, University
of Cincinnati College of Law 2010, for invaluable research assistance.
1
Dow Jones Interactive Learning Center, DOW Historical Timeline, http://www.djindexes.com/
DJIA110/learning-center/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
2
Id. The low for 2008 was 8149 on Dec. 1. Id.
3
For an early analysis of the banks’ role in the financial meltdown, see THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FIN. MKTS, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (Mar. 2008)
("Financial Market Developments Policy Statement"), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf. The Federal Reserve Board announced in May 2009
that ten of the nation’s largest bank holding companies, including Bank of America and Citigroup,
remain significantly undercapitalized. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE
SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS (May 7, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf.
4
FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STATEMENT OF FHFA DIRECTOR JAMES B. LOCKHART 5 (Sept. 7,
2008), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf.
5
The U.S. government currently owns 80% equity interest in AIG. Press Release, U.S. Treasury
Dep’t, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan
(Mar. 2, 2009) (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg44.htm).
6
Several large investment firms entered into settlements with the SEC and state regulators over
their marketing of ARS. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Citigroup Agrees in Principle to Auction Rate
Securities Settlement, (Aug. 7, 2008) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-168.htm).
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and its suspension of redemptions;7 and
6. allegations of market manipulation, false rumors, and naked
short selling in the securities markets.8
This annus horribilis concluded with Bernard Madoff’s confession
that he ran an old fashioned Ponzi scheme for decades in plain sight of
regulators that caused upwards of $50 billion in losses to scores of wealthy
investors and charitable foundations.9
The impact of these events on the retail investor has been
devastating. Forty-seven percent of American households own stocks or
bonds, with the growth in stock-ownership rates largely attributable to
employees’ participation in employer sponsored retirement plans.10
Workers increasingly bear the risk of market fluctuations in funding their
retirements, and those nearing retirement are in grave danger of coming up
short.11 Investors’ confidence in the capital markets has been severely
undermined. Meanwhile, securities firms are returning to the retail
brokerage business, their “bread and butter,”12 creating the risk that
panicked investors will become the victims of future frauds.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Agency”),
the federal agency with the principal responsibility to protect investors from
7
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement at SEC Open Meeting
(June 24, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch062409mls.htm (proposing reforms to
regulation of money market funds).
8
Press Release, SEC, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets
(Sept. 19, 2008) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm) (pointing out that the
SEC “took temporary emergency action to prohibit short selling” in stocks of financial companies
because of concerns about market manipulation); see also SEC, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 10 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2008.pdf#sec1
[hereinafter 2008 PAR] (describing SEC's responses to market turmoil).
9
Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests a Top Trader in Vast Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
10
INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN
AMERICA, 2008, at 3, 5 (2008), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners.pdf.
11
Editorial, From Here to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A22 (stating that two-thirds of
U.S. workers have only 401(k) plans and estimating a $2 trillion cumulative wipe-out of retirement
savings so far). Many employers have announced that they will no longer contribute to their employees’
retirement accounts. See Phyllis Korkki, Businesses Put Trimmers to Work on Their 401(k)'s, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2009, at BU2. Investment companies marketed target date mutual funds (designed to
move investors into more conservative investments as they approach retirement) to older workers; yet,
the average loss in thirty-one funds with a 2010 target date was reportedly 25%, and losses varied widely
among available 2010 funds. The SEC and Department of Labor held a hearing on June 18, 2009 on
target funds. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement at SEC-DOL Hearing on Target Date
Funds (June 18, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809mls.htm.
12
Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch in something of a shotgun marriage arranged by the
Federal Reserve. See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sep.
15, 2008, at A1 (explaining that the merger would reshape the landscape by “making the nation's prime
behemoth even bigger.”). On June 1, 2009, Morgan Stanley and Citi announced the closing of their
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney joint venture to “create a new global leader in wealth management.” Press
Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley and Citi Launch Joint Venture to Create New Global Leader
in Wealth Management (June 1, 2009) (available at http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/
0f9d8d36-4ea4-11de-96f6-3f25a44c9933.html).
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fraud and unfair dealing, prides itself on being “the investor’s advocate.”13
Accordingly, an obvious question is why did not the SEC do a better job of
protecting retail investors from financial disaster? In this essay I will first
set forth some comparisons between other recent financial crises and the
2008 financial meltdown. I will then provide an assessment of the SEC’s
role during the financial crisis and conclude with a review of key provisions
of the Obama Administration’s proposed financial regulatory reform
package that affect the SEC and investor protection. The Obama proposal
offers no redesign of the SEC, relying instead on SEC Chairman Schapiro’s
commitment to re-energize and recommit the Agency to investor protection.
It remains very much to be seen whether these efforts will be sufficient to
protect the retail investor from future fraud and to restore her confidence in
the markets.
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT
In the past ten years, the U.S. has experienced a disturbing number
of financial crises, including the dot-com bubble and its crash,14 the
accounting frauds that brought down some of our largest corporations (e.g.,
Enron, WorldCom) and one of our largest accounting firms (Arthur
Andersen),15 the “tainted research” scandal that exposed the serious conflicts
of interest among sell-side financial analysts,16 and the market timing and
late trading mutual fund scandals.17 We can make some useful comparisons
between these past scandals and the 2008 financial meltdown.
In the earlier scandals, retail investors were often scolded for acting
stupidly and greedily. New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg was
quoted as condemning as a “disgrace” the fraudulent accounting, but he
went on to say that those who have been buying stocks at multiples that
“never made any sense” should also look in the mirror: “They’re as
responsible, I think, as those who actually committed the crimes of
misstating earnings and fudging the numbers . . . .”18 The retail investors
suffered more in the earlier scandals than did sophisticated investors. The
“smart money,” for example, better understood the cheerleading nature of
analysts’ reports;19 the market timing and late trading activities were classic
examples of the “haves” benefiting at the expense of the “have-nots,” for it
13
The phrase is attributed to William Douglas and is posted on the SEC’s website. Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Address to the Council of Institutional Investors (Apr. 6, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch040609mls.htm.
14
See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING
(2004).
15
See KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS (2005).
16
See Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
303, 308-09 (2008).
17
See id. at 309-10.
18
TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 3536 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of New York).
19
Black, supra note 16, at 308-09.
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was the “big-ticket” mutual fund purchasers that profited at the expense of
the other fund investors.20
In contrast, it is acknowledged that the “smart money” caused the
current financial meltdown. The origins of the meltdown were (1) bad
lending practices in the residential mortgage business, followed by (2) the
securitization process21 that created bad securities that infected all the
markets.22 There was “a significant erosion of market discipline by those
involved in the securitization process, including originators, underwriters,
credit rating agencies, and global investors . . . .”23 These investors were
primarily sophisticated investors, and securities law traditionally does not
worry so much about disclosure to sophisticated investors because the law
expects that they can ask the right questions and conduct their own due
diligence. However, we learned that these investors had poor risk
management policies and lacked accessible and useful information about the
products; in virtually every description of the securitization process, the
words “lack of transparency” or “opaque” are used.24 In addition, these
sophisticated investors failed to conduct their own due diligence and instead
placed their reliance on credit ratings that had serious flaws in the
assessments of the structured finance products.25 Alan Greenspan, former
head of the Federal Reserve and perhaps the strongest advocate for the
power of the market to regulate itself, acknowledged that the failures of the
risk management systems used by sophisticated investors precipitated the
financial meltdown.26
Moreover, sophisticated investors have suffered along with the rest
of us. The irony of the Madoff scandal is that classic Ponzi schemes are
affinity frauds targeted at the least sophisticated individuals in a
20

Id. at 309-10.
An investment bank buys a pool of mortgages from an originator, organizes a “Special Purpose
Vehicle” or SPV, and sells the pool to the SPV. The SPV then issues securities representing fractional
interests in the pool, entitled to payments based on the cash flow from the underlying mortgages. For a
fuller description, see Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown and How to Fix It 11 (Dickinson Sch. of Law, Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 09-2009, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1354062.
22
The origins of the meltdown were the deterioration of mortgage origination standards. The
Financial Market Developments Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION, REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 43 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter FRR]; Floyd Norris, A
Debacle That Has Wall Street in the Dark, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C1.
25
THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS, supra note 3, at 2.
26
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators Before the H. Comm. of Government
Oversight and Reform, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (testimony by Dr. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman,
Federal Reserve Bank), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081023100
438.pdf; see also Harvey L. Pitt, Learning the Lessons of the Sub-Prime Crisis, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Oct.
30, 2007, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3740/learning-the-lessons-of-the-sub-prime-crisis
(describing the root cause of the crisis as financial institutions' irrational beliefs and unfounded
assumptions).
21
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community.27 Madoff’s victims, however, included major educational
institutions and wealthy investors whom we might have expected to know
better.28
Finally, after the earlier scandals, the SEC was seen as the solution.
Perhaps it should not have been—it did not penetrate the complexities of
Enron’s SEC filings; it may have turned a blind eye to the market timing
and late trading scandals. But, nevertheless, Congress had confidence in the
SEC; it gave the Agency extensive rulemaking powers in the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)29 and, after holding numerous hearings on
mutual fund reform, came to believe the Agency would provide better
regulation over the mutual fund industry.30
This time, many see the SEC as the problem.31 Before we assess the
Agency’s recent performance, however, it is important to emphasize that all
branches of government must share the blame for the regulatory failures:
•

Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (“GLB”),32 the 1999 legislation that
restructured the financial services industry and removed the
restrictions that separated banking, securities, and insurance
businesses, did not provide for consolidated supervision over the
five large investment company holding companies that did not have
a commercial bank (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch).

•

Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 200033 specifically
prohibited the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) from regulating CDS and other OTC
derivatives; as of September 2008, there was $55 trillion in CDS
exposure outstanding.34

•

Credit rating agencies were largely unregulated until the enactment,
in 2006, of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (“CRARA”),35

27

See generally Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the
Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV.
473, 493 (2006).
28
See Madoff’s Victims, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2009, http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/
documents/st_madoff_victims_20081215.html.
29
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 745, 749 (codified in sections 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
30
Black, supra note 16, at 320.
31
See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The Decline and Fall of the S.E.C., NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 18, 2008,
http://executivesuite.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/the-decline-and-fall-of-the-sec/.
32
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000)); see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
33
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
34
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators:
Lessons from the Credit Crisis for the Future of Regulation (Oct. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts102308cc.htm.
35
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327.
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even though they were identified as part of the problem in the
collapse of Enron and WorldCom where the agencies did not
downgrade those corporations’ bond ratings to below investment
grade until days before they filed for bankruptcy.36
•

The D.C. Circuit consistently struck down even modest regulatory
extension by the SEC.37

In short, there was a pervasive deregulatory climate that put its faith
in the power of market discipline.
II. ASSESSING THE SEC'S PERFORMANCE
In 2008, the Agency’s seventy-fifth anniversary, the reputation of
the SEC plummeted, although the nature of the criticisms changed during
the year. Initially, advocates of market discipline charged that the Agency’s
heavy-handed regulation put the U.S. capital markets at a competitive
disadvantage. In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Treasury released its
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (“Blueprint”).38
The genesis of the study was the perception that “U.S. regulatory structure is
not optimal for promoting a competitive financial services sector leading the
world and supporting continued economic innovation at home and
abroad.”39 The Blueprint proposed a reduced role for the SEC. Market
stability and prudential financial regulation would be the responsibility of
the Federal Reserve, and business conduct regulation and corporate
disclosure would be divided between two agencies. In particular, the
Blueprint was extremely critical of what it described as the SEC’s “rulesbased” as opposed to a “principles-based” regulatory approach, and it called
for greater reliance on industry self regulation.40
With the collapse of Bear Stearns in spring 2008, and again in the
fall with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the criticisms of the Agency
focused on its failure to predict or prevent the investment banks’ collapse.
SEC Chairman Cox acknowledged the inadequacy of the measures of
capital and liquidity used by the SEC and blamed the gaps in the regulatory
system created by GLB.41 Increasingly, the SEC was seen as “out-of-the36

Claire Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 43 (2004).
See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that SEC’s rule
requiring registration of hedge fund advisers exceeded its authority); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (striking down the SEC rule that required mutual funds to
have a majority of independent directors).
38
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf
[hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT].
39
Id. at 1.
40
Id. at 11-13, 19-20, 109-13.
41
Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit Crisis for the
Future of Regulation Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 5 (2008)
37
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loop” and irrelevant to dealing with the financial meltdown.42
After the collapse of Bear Stearns, and perhaps to minimize that
regulatory failure, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox consistently described
the SEC as, first and foremost, a law enforcement agency.43 The Agency’s
2008 Performance and Accountability Report, issued on November 14,
2008, emphasized the enforcement division’s accomplishments: it
completed the highest number of enforcement investigations in any year to
date, initiated the second-highest number of enforcement actions in Agency
history, and set the record, in each of the last two years, for the highest
number of corporate penalty cases in its history.44 In addition, the Agency
devoted more than one-third of its staff to the enforcement program,
increased the number of enforcement personnel by 4%, and allocated
internally its highest amount of funds for enforcement in its history.45 Then,
on December 11, 2008, Bernard Madoff was arrested after he confessed to
his two sons, both of whom were senior employees at his firm, Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities LLC, that he had been running a giant Ponzi
scheme for twenty years.46 He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced
to 150 years in prison.47
Thus, at Mary Schapiro’s confirmation hearing as new SEC Chair in
January 2009, she identified as her priorities “to reinvigorate enforcement”48
and “to reengage the SEC with the people we serve, namely, investors.”49
Senators repeatedly asked her if she was “up to the task”50 and “ready and
willing to take on [an] . . . incredibly tattered . . . marketplace[.]”51 Schapiro
had to reassure senators that she could be “as aggressive an enforcer as
anybody . . . .”52
How can we account for the SEC’s failures? We will look at three
recent events to see what lessons we can learn from them.

(testimony of Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/
stories/documents/20081023100525.pdf [hereinafter Cox Testimony].
42
See, e.g., Kara Scannell & Susanne Craig, SEC Chief Under Fire as Fed Seeks Bigger Wall Street
Role, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2008, at A1; Editorial, Not Much of a Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008,
at A28.
43
Cox Testimony, supra note 41.
44
2008 PAR, supra note 8, at 3.
45
Id.
46
Henriques & Kouwe, supra note 9, at A1, B5.
47
Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1.
48
The Nomination of Mary Schapiro to Head the SEC: Panel I of a Hearing of the S. Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. 12 (2009) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing of
Schapiro].
49
Id. at 13.
50
Id. at 29 (question by Senator Menendez).
51
Id. (question by Senator Menendez).
52
Id. at 30.
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Credit Rating Agencies. The credit rating agencies played an
important gatekeeping function in the marketing of mortgage-related
securities because many institutional investors are prohibited from
purchasing products that do not receive an investment grade rating. The
problems with credit rating agencies are well-known: (1) lack of
competition—the only significant agencies are Moody’s, S&P, and, to a
lesser extent, Fitch; (2) conflicts of interest—issuers pay the agencies to rate
their securities and frequently pay them for consulting services on “credit
enhancement;” and (3) little accountability for poor performance.53 As the
performance of mortgage-related securities deteriorated, the agencies
downgraded a significant number of their ratings, thus raising questions
about the accuracy of the initial ratings and the integrity of the process as a
whole.
In 2007–2008, the SEC conducted an examination of rating
agencies’ role in the collapse of the subprime mortgage-related securities
market. The report found that there was a substantial increase in the number
and complexity of the deals since 2002 and a corresponding increase in the
revenues derived from rating these products.54 As a result, staff at the
agencies could not keep up with the workload. The SEC staff reported that
“[o]ne analyst expressed concern that her firm’s model did not capture ‘half’
of the deal’s risk, but that ‘it could be structured by cows and we would rate
it.’”55 An email by a rating agency’s employee stated: “[T]ensions are high.
Just too much work, not enough people, pressure from [the] company . . .
.”56 Another prayed: “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time
this house of cards falters.”57 Rating agencies did not verify the information
contained in the loan portfolios presented to them for rating, and they did
not insist that the issuers perform due diligence.58 Their surveillance
processes were even “less robust”59 than the initial ratings process.
Critically, while the agencies had policies restricting the analysts from
participating in fee discussions with issuers, the report found that analysts
were very aware of the fees generated by their ratings.60
Despite their importance, and their past problems associated with

53
See generally Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws,
68 Fed. Reg. 35,258 (June 12, 2003); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS 283-314 (2006); Hill, supra
note 36, at 43.
54
SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATION OF
SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 10 (July 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/
craexamination070808.pdf.
55
Id. at 12.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 16.
59
Id. at 21.
60
SEC, supra note 54, at 24.
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Enron, credit rating agencies escaped regulation61 until Congress enacted
CRARA,62 the purpose of which was to “‘improve credit ratings quality by
fostering competition, accountability, and transparency in the credit rating
industry . . . .’”63 CRARA is a modest piece of legislation that seeks to
solve these intractable problems through increased competition and
disclosure. An SEC registration process for every Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”) is supposed to remove barriers
to entry,64 and disclosure about an agency’s procedures, methodologies,
conflicts of interest, and track record in assessing credit-worthiness is
supposed to create more informed consumers of ratings who will shop for
quality.65 However, while CRARA authorizes the SEC to implement
reporting and oversight rules (including management of conflicts of interest)
with respect to NRSROs, the statute requires that the rules be “narrowly
tailored” to meet the Act’s requirements.66 Moreover, CRARA forbids the
SEC from regulating “the substance of the credit ratings or the procedures
and methodologies”67 by which the credit agencies determine ratings and
expressly does not create private remedies for violations of the reporting
requirements.68
To date, the SEC has engaged in two rounds of rule-making under
CRARA.69 The second set, adopted in February 2009, specifically
addresses concerns about the integrity of the procedures and methodologies
used to rate structured finance products.70 Thus, for example, agencies must
disclose whether they rely on information about verification performed on
61
SOX § 702(b) directed the SEC to study credit rating agencies. The study, released in January
2003, identified a wide range of issues for further study. See SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 1 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf. The SEC then issued a concept release in
summer 2003 seeking public comment on various issues relating to credit rating agencies, including
whether credit ratings should continue to be used for regulatory purposes under the federal securities
laws, and, if so, the process of determining whose credit ratings should be used, and the level of
oversight to apply to such credit rating agencies. Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,259-61. The industry was able to drag out the legislative
process until fall 2006.
62
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 1327.
63
Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Final Rules to Implement the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 (May 23, 2007) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-104.htm)
(quoting Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman); see also S. Rep. No. 109-326, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter Senate
Report].
64
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a) (2006); see also Senate Report, supra note 63, at 6, 7.
65
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(i-ii), (vi), (a)(3).
66
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2).
67
Id. The credit rating agency industry has, thus far, been successful in persuading Congress and
some courts that credit ratings have First Amendment protections. For a critique of these assertions, see
Frank Partnoy, Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No.
07-46), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900257.
68
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(2).
69
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2008). Adopted in 2007, the first round of rulemaking included rules
prescribing the process for a credit rating agency to apply for registration.
70
Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg.
6,456, 6,456, 6,484 (Feb. 9, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
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the assets in determining the rating.71 Every NRSRO must also make
publicly available a random sample of 10% of issuer-paid ratings and their
histories for each class of rating for which the agency has issued 500 or
more, provided in an XBRL format.72 The SEC also has outstanding a rule
proposal to eliminate use of ratings in the SEC rules promulgated under the
Investment Company and Investment Adviser Acts, reflecting its concern
that investors have over-relied on credit ratings.73
It is too soon to assess the SEC’s rulemaking efforts under CRARA,
and Chairman Schapiro has indicated that the SEC may issue further rules.74
Ten NRSROs have registered with the SEC,75 but to date it appears
questionable that the newcomers will provide meaningful competition for
the Big Three. The emphasis on disclosure as a panacea seems dubious;
because of the complexity of the products, it seems unrealistic to expect that
most investors will conduct their own due diligence instead of “overrelying” on ratings. The significance of the limitations on the SEC’s
authority, moreover, cannot be minimized. To summarize: these are very
modest measures indeed to deal with the fundamental problem of agencies’
conflicts of interest.
The Collapse of Bear Stearns. The collapse of two Bear Stearns
hedge funds in summer 2007 is generally recognized as the beginning of the
financial meltdown.76 After credit agencies dropped ratings on many assetbacked securities, Bear Stearns announced that the two funds were virtually
worthless, having lost over 90% of their value.77 Bear Stearns’ forced sale
in spring 2008 made clear the fragility of the big banks resulting from the
financing of long-term, risky assets with short-term loans, the creation of
complex, unregulated products and, most fundamentally, the serious
weaknesses in risk management practices at the large financial institutions.78
After Bear Stearns’ collapse, SEC Chairman Cox said that “[f]or the first
71

Id. at 6,459.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(d) (2009).
73
See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed.
Reg. 40,124, 40,124 (July 11, 2008).
74
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement at SEC Roundtable on
Credit Rating Agencies (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch041509mls.htm; see
also Re-Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 6485
(proposed Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243).
75
SEC, Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2009).
76
Allan Sloan, The Financial Meltdown’s Unhappy Anniversary, FORTUNE MAGAZINE ONLINE,
May 15, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/15/news/economy/bear.stearns.fortune/.
77
Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth Little, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2007, at C2.
78
See generally THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS, supra note 3, at 1; SENIOR
SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES DURING THE RECENT
MARKET TURBULENCE 2 (2008), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/
SSG_Risk_Mgt_doc_final.pdf.
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time, a major investment bank that was well-capitalized and apparently fully
liquid experienced a crisis of confidence that denied it . . . financing . . . .”79
This, however, begs the question: was Bear Stearns well-capitalized?
The SEC regulates net capital requirements for broker-dealers that
are intended to protect customers’ assets;80 its regulatory authority does not
extend to the holding company or non-broker-dealer entities. In the 1980s,
the investment banking firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert, was financially
weakened because of the business activities of its non-broker-dealer
affiliates.81 In 1998, Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that
was run by MIT and Nobel Prize winning economists, collapsed when the
“smart money” made stupid mistakes that threatened to bring down the
financial system because of the interconnectedness of financial institutions
and markets.82 Thus, the SEC understood that other business affiliates could
bring down the broker-dealer firm.83 Yet GLB, in its restructuring of the
financial services industry, left a loophole; there was no consolidated
supervision of those five major investment banking firms that did not have a
commercial bank. The SEC sought, but Congress did not give it, this
authority.84
In 2004, those five firms in fact wanted SEC oversight of their
consolidated entities, because the European Union (“EU”) requires a
consolidated regulator for financial services firms.85 Accordingly, the SEC
set up the voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entities (“CSE”) Program to
provide oversight of the financial and operational condition of the firms at
both the holding company and regulated entity level.86 The CSE Program
required the CSEs to maintain and document a system of internal controls;
the SEC would approve the controls at the time of application and monitor
the controls on an ongoing basis.87 In addition, the SEC allowed the firms to
calculate their net capital requirements on an alternative basis.88 Its
rationale reflects the deregulatory religion of the era: “firms with strong
79
Testimony Concerning Recent Events in the Credit Markets Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/CoxOpeningStatement.pdf.
80
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009).
81
See generally The Issues Surrounding the Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990).
82
See Philippe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons from Long-Term Capital Management 1 (June
1999) (unpublished draft, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=169449).
83
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,872, 62,872 (proposed Nov. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
[hereinafter Alternative Net Capital Proposed Rule].
84
Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, Address to the Security Traders 12th Annual Washington
Conference (May 7, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch050708cc.htm.
85
Alternative Net Capital Proposed Rule, supra note 83, at 62,874.
86
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004).
87
Id. at 34,428-29.
88
Id.
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internal risk management practices will be able to use mathematical
modeling methods already used to manage business risks for regulatory
purposes.”89 In this way, the SEC thought it created additional incentives
for firms to implement strong risk management practices.
We know now that the CSE Program was a failure.90 Chairman
Cox’s explanation for the failure of the program was that it was “voluntary”
regulation,91 but this seems facile, if not misleading. The CSE Program was
voluntary in the sense that it was not statutorily required, but the SEC
certainly had regulatory clout because, if the firms opted out of the program,
they would be required to comply with the EU regulation that they sought to
avoid. In fall 2008, the SEC’s Office of Inspector General issued a report
sharply critical of both the design and the SEC’s oversight of the CSE
Program.92 In particular, it found that the SEC staff became aware of
numerous “red flags” that should have tipped it off to Bear Stearns’
shortcomings in risk management and overconcentration in mortgage
securities that led to its liquidity crisis. This suggests that the CSE Program
failed because the agency lacked the manpower and expertise to provide
adequate oversight.93
In fact, the initial premise of the CSE Program—that the firms’
business practices and the regulators’ concerns could coincide—was faulty,
and the Agency’s reliance on market discipline was simply naive. In fall
2008, the only two surviving banks that were in the CSE Program became
bank holding companies under the oversight of the Federal Reserve.94 As a
result of the CSE Program, there is general agreement that there is no role
for the SEC in monitoring systemic risk.
The Madoff Scandal. In sharp contrast to credit rating agencies and
the five investment banks previously in the CSE Program, the regulation of
89

Id. at 34,428.
Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program
(Sept. 26, 2008) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm) [hereinafter End of
CSE Program Release]; H. DAVID KOTZ, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES:
THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 446-A at viii (Sept. 25, 2008),
available at http:// www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf [hereinafter SEC
INSPECTOR GENERAL CSE PROGRAM REPORT].
91
End of CSE Program Release, supra note 90.
92
SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL CSE PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 90, at viii-xi. The SEC Inspector
General also was critical of the agency’s performance in its Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program that
tracks 146 broker-dealers that are part of a holding company structure and have at least $120 million in
capital. See H. DAVID KOTZ, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: BROKERDEALER RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 446-B at v (Sept. 25, 2008), available at www.secoig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-b.pdf.
93
Professors Coffee and Sale’s conclusion—that the SEC was “outgunned” by the banks—is
consistent with this. John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 742 (2009).
94
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of an Era,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2008, at A1.
90
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broker-dealers and investment advisers is central to the SEC’s power and
mission; there was no regulatory gap. Thus, the Madoff scandal95 presents
the most troubling question that the SEC must grapple with: how could
Bernard Madoff conduct his Ponzi scheme for two decades in plain sight of
the regulators—not just the SEC, but also NASD/FINRA, the self-regulatory
organization with primary responsibility for regulating broker-dealer
firms?96
Immediately after Madoff was arrested, the SEC acknowledged that
“credible and specific allegations regarding Mr. Madoff’s financial
wrongdoing, going back at least until 1999, were repeatedly brought to the
attention of SEC staff.”97 A derivatives expert and trader, Harry
Markopolos, repeatedly made detailed submissions to the SEC’s Boston
office, who referred the matter to the New York branch. In his November 7,
2005, nineteen-page submission, Markopolos set forth an analysis of
performance data to back up his assertion that Madoff’s trading strategy
could not work and that it was “[h]ighly likely” that Madoff Securities was
the world’s largest Ponzi scheme.98 At least after the third submission, the
SEC’s New York office conducted an investigation. The staff, relying on
voluntary production of documents and testimony, found no evidence of
fraud, but did find that Madoff acted as an unregistered investment adviser.
It closed the investigation after Madoff registered with the SEC as an
investment adviser because it concluded that “those violations were not so
serious as to warrant an enforcement action.”99 As recently as spring 2008,
Markopolos again submitted his analysis to the SEC, this time to the D.C.
office, and received no reply.100
How could this happen? Unfortunately, while there are many
possible explanations, they cannot explain the enormity of the Agency’s
failure. The SEC staff may have lacked the expertise to understand the
improbability of Madoff’s trading strategy.101 They may have been
95
For a brief narrative of the salient facts, see Amir Efrati et al., Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion
Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
96
Kara Scannell, Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at C1
(noting that the SEC and other regulators examined Madoff or his firm “at least eight times in sixteen
years”).
97
Press Release, SEC, Statement Regarding Madoff Investigation (Dec. 16, 2008) (available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-297.htm) [hereinafter SEC Madoff Statement].
98
Gregory Zuckerman & Kara Scannell, Madoff Misled SEC in ’06, Got Off, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2008, at A1; Harry Markopolos, The World’s Largest Hedge Fund Is a Fraud 2 (2005), available at
http://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20090127/Markopolos_Memo_SEC.pdf.
99
SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, CASE CLOSING RECOMMENDATION, CASE NO. NY–07563 (Nov. 21,
2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Madoff_SECRecommend_
20081217.pdf.
100
Zuckerman, supra note 98.
101
This is Markopolos’ primary explanation; the SEC is an agency with too many lawyers, and not
enough industry people on staff. Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski Holds a Hearing on Regulatory Failures Before
the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 4,
19, 34, 50 (2009) (testimony of Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/markopolos020409.pdf [hereinafter Markopolos Testimony].
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“dazzled” by Madoff’s reputation; he was one of the Wall Street legends
and a former chair of NASDAQ who had served on influential SEC
advisory groups.102 “Industry capture”—attendance at industry sponsored
meetings and conferences and post-SEC job opportunities—may have
played a part as well.103 Insufficient funding is a perennial difficulty that is
unlikely ever to go away;104 scarce resources require setting priorities; and
the SEC staff may have thought that since Madoff’s clients were
sophisticated investors, they could look out for themselves.105 Some critics
have suggested that the pressure to resolve enforcement actions quickly may
cause SEC staff to go after the “small fish” or uncomplicated cases.106 SEC
Chairman Cox identified systemic problems as a possible cause and noted
that the allegations never reached the level of the Commission; failure to
seek a formal order of investigation meant the staff did not have subpoena
power.107 Was this a staff error, or does it suggest a problem with the tone
at the top? Did the staff feel “handcuffed” by the Commissioners? While
some recent Commissioners have been skeptical of, if not hostile toward,
enforcement,108 the duration of the fraud and the Agency’s failure to detect it
for so many years, mean that the deregulatory Bush-era environment cannot
be the sole cause. Others have focused on the relationship between the
enforcement division and the office of inspections and examinations and
have suggested that the 1994 separation of inspections and examinations
from the enforcement division meant that the latter had less real-time “on
the ground” information.109 Finally, there is the problem of how to separate
102
Chairman Cox specifically asked the SEC’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) to investigate
staff contacts and relationships with Madoff and his firm and any impact they may have had on staff
decisions. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi and the Need for Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of H. David Kotz, Inspector General of the
SEC),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/kotz010509.pdf
[hereinafter OIG Testimony]. One of the criticisms of the SEC staff over the years has been that they go
after big names (e.g., Martha Stewart, Mark Cuban) for personal glory and professional advantage.
Perhaps the considerations are different when the person is in the securities industry.
103
But staff cannot acquire expertise in a vacuum. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
104
The SEC attributed a decrease in the examinations of mutual funds and investment advisers in
part to decreased funding. SEC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 137 (2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/2008budgetperform.pdf.; see also, Press Release, SEC, Statement from
Chairman Schapiro on Proposed Budget for SEC (Feb. 26, 2009) (available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-37.htm) ( noting that “the President's FY 2010 budget request
for the SEC . . . represents a 13 percent increase over its FY 2008 budget”).
105
According to the Washington Post, in 2004, an SEC attorney noted discrepancies in information
provided by Madoff, but was instructed by her supervisors to focus instead on mutual fund investigations
because of the publicity generated by revelations of the market-timing activities. Zachary A. Goldfarb,
Staffer at SEC Had Warned of Madoff, WASH. POST, July 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070104223.html.
106
Joe Nocera, S.E.C. Chased Small Fry While Big Fish, Madoff, Swam Free, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2009, at B1.
107
SEC Madoff Statement, supra note 97.
108
Paul S. Atkins, who was an SEC Commissioner from 2002–2008, was particularly vocal in his
criticism of enforcement. See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the Exchequer Club of Washington,
D.C. (July 16, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch071608psa.htm) (calling
for an independent advisory panel to evaluate the enforcement program).
109
The OIG is conducting an official investigation. See OIG Testimony, supra note 102, at 2.
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wheat from chaff—the SEC gets lots of tips, frequently from competitors of
the alleged wrongdoer.110 Nevertheless, whatever its causes, the Madoff
scandal will be remembered as one of the greatest stains on the SEC’s
reputation.
III. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF THE SEC
In June 2009, the Department of Treasury released the Obama
Administration's package of proposed reforms, Financial Regulatory
Reform – A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and
Regulation (“FRR”).111 The visionary title and the document's length
(eighty-eight pages) are misleading; given the enormity of the problems, the
proposed reforms are modest, and as of the writing of the essay, it is not
possible to predict the likelihood of success of even these modest measures.
The 2008 financial meltdown demonstrated the interconnectedness
of firms and markets; hence, a consensus has emerged that the most pressing
reform measure is systemic risk monitoring.
As expected, the
Administration proposes that the Federal Reserve will act as the systemic
risk regulator,112 with some vaguely defined role for a Financial Services
Oversight Council that will replace the shadowy President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets.113 The Fed will formally become what pragmatically
it already is, the consolidated regulator for all banks.114
The second important reform advanced in the FRR is better
consumer protection with respect to credit instruments and the recognition
that the marketing of complicated financial products with poorly disclosed
or even disguised onerous terms does not serve consumers well. However,
the banking industry already is mounting a concerted effort to defeat the

110
Since their appointments, both SEC Chairman Schapiro and Director of Enforcement Khuzami
have spoken frequently on reinvigorating the enforcement division and improving the review of tips.
See Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Serv. and General Government, 111th Cong. 1-2
(2009) (statement of Mary Shapiro, SEC Chairman), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2009/ts031109mls.htm; Strengthening the SEC’s Vital Enforcement Responsibilities: Hearing Before the
S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, 111th
Cong. 5-10 (2009) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement of the SEC),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
e939892e-0d06-4da7-9ddf-52a2def98458.
111
FRR, supra note 24.
112
Id. at 20. The recent congressional grilling of Benjamin Bernanke over the Bank of America–
Merrill Lynch merger suggests some legislative opposition to the Federal Reserve’s expanded powers.
Edmund L. Andrews & Louise Story, G.O.P. to Paint Bernanke as Big Government Ally, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2009, at B1.
113
The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets was created by Executive Order after the
October 1987 market crash; its members include the Treasury Secretary and the Chairmen of the Federal
Reserve Board, SEC, and CFTC. See Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9,421 (March 18, 1988).
Little is known about its actual workings. See Simon Dumenco, Saved by the Cabal!, N.Y. MAG., Jan.
27, 2008, http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/43342/.
114
FRR, supra note 24, at 12, 36.
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Consumer Financial Protection Agency,115 the proposal’s boldest proconsumer initiative;116 the battle over this proposed agency will be an
important test of the Administration’s commitment to consumer protection.
Focusing specifically on the SEC, given its failings, the Agency
emerges relatively unscathed. As with previous financial scandals,117 the
Administration has chosen to view the Agency’s missteps as resulting from
insufficient resources and lack of leadership, perhaps because it does not
wish to expend political capital on structural reforms. Thus, the SEC is
expected to receive some additional funding and some new staff positions,
principally in the examination118 and enforcement119 programs. SEC
Chairman Schapiro has apparently persuaded the Administration that she is
indeed “up to the task,”120 and she quickly recruited from outside the agency
an experienced prosecutor to head up the enforcement division.121 As a
result, apart from losing oversight over investment banks (a role it had
already abandoned), the SEC has not lost any power and will not have to
undergo restructuring. Although the FRR calls for closing the loophole that
left OTC derivatives unregulated and for “comprehensive” regulation of
OTC derivatives,122 it does not call for a merger of the CFTC and SEC,
although their turf wars have been a significant distraction over the years.
Instead, the FRR directs the agencies to work together to harmonize futures
and securities regulation.123 Similarly, although initial press reports
suggested that the new consumer protection agency would take over the
regulation of mutual funds, in recognition of the importance of this
investment vehicle to retail investors,124 the SEC will retain that authority,
despite its past poor performance. The SEC will gain modest expansion of
powers in some areas; for example, hedge fund advisers will be required to
register with the SEC.125 Otherwise, it is more of the same for the SEC,
with an expectation that it will perform better. Thus, there are vague
115
This new agency would assume responsibility for protecting consumers in the financial products
and services markets, except for products and services already regulated by the SEC or CFTC. Id. at 55.
116
Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, July, 1 2009,
at B1.
117
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
118
SEC, FY 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION IN BRIEF 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.
sec.gov/about/secfy10congbudgjust.pdf.; see also id. at 10 (devoting additional resources to assessing
how investment advisers and broker-dealers verify existence and maintain control and custody of
customers’ assets).
119
Id. at 13 (stating that the highest priority is to respond to the current financial crisis).
120
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
121
Press Release, SEC, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director of Enforcement (Feb. 19, 2009)
(available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-31.htm).
122
FRR, supra note 24, at 46.
123
FRR, supra note 24, at 49-50. Since the CFTC’s creation, the agencies have dueled over this
issue. In recognition of turf warfare, the FRR expects the new Financial Services Oversight Council to
mediate disputes. Id. at 51.
124
Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., U.S. May Add New Financial Watchdog, WASH. POST, May 20,
2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/19/
AR2009051903061_pf.html.
125
FRR, supra note 24, at 12, 37.
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references to “expanded” authority to mandate more disclosure,126 additional
regulation of credit rating agencies127 (with no recognition of a need for
more statutory authority to cure the statute’s limitations128), and
harmonization of investment adviser and broker-dealer regulation.129 Some
of the investor protection proposals sound frankly like window dressing,
e.g., the creation of a Financial Consumer Coordinating Council to address
gaps in investor and consumer protection130 and additional studies on the
much debated issue of the fairness of mandatory arbitration in consumer131
and securities disputes.132
More generally, what lessons can we learn from the recent
regulatory failures? First, we must get rid of the “hands off” attitude toward
institutional and sophisticated investors that is ingrained into the regulatory
climate. For too long, policymakers have thought that some investors are so
smart that regulators should not stand in their way, for fear of stifling
innovation and investment opportunities. We have learned, once again, that
the “smart money” is not so smart, and, more importantly, their errors are
colossal ones that impact every aspect of the economy and harm all of us.
Second, voluntary regulation does not work, as Chairman Cox came
to recognize.133 Market discipline does not work, as Alan Greenspan
learned.134 Industry self-regulation, while a practical necessity, has serious
limitations.135 Investors’ advocates must guard vigilantly against warnings
about the dangers of over-regulation that we are already hearing. In fact, I
submit that we need never worry about over- regulation; business interests
have many well-funded and effective lobbyists, including the securities and
accounting industries, small business, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
to make sure that this does not happen.136
What combination of factors is necessary for an effective regulator
is outside the scope of this essay.137 Nevertheless, I suggest there are certain
minimum requirements for an effective regulator: (1) a clearly defined
126

Id. at 13, 45 (ABS), 70 (point of sale disclosures).
Id. at 46.
128
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
129
FRR, supra note 24, at 71.
130
Id. at 73.
131
Id. at 62.
132
Id. at 72. As co-author of a recent empirical study on the securities arbitration process, I feel
well-qualified to state there is no aspect of this issue that requires further study. See Jill I. Gross &
Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of the
Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 349 (2008).
133
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
134
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
135
SEC, Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,256 (proposed Dec.
8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
136
Since 1990, the financial industry has contributed $2.2 billion in political contributions; since
1998, Wall Street has been the top spender on lobbying activities. Elizabeth Williamson et al., Finance
Lobby Cut Spending As Feds Targeted Wall Street, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2009, at A1.
137
The question of defining effectiveness is also outside the scope of this essay.
127
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mission, (2) the power to effect that mission, (3) expertise, (4) resources,
and finally, (5) commitment to its mission.138 The SEC has a clearly defined
mission—to protect investors. 139 The FRR seeks to address some major
gaps in statutory authority, although perhaps not as cleanly as we might
wish. The Agency apparently recognizes the need to improve expertise on
the staff, and the Administration, at least temporarily, has committed
additional resources to the Agency. So we are left with that intangible—the
Agency’s commitment to its mission, notwithstanding political, industry, or
personal pressures to the contrary.140
I will conclude by telling another story about the SEC from 2008.
In June 2008, the SEC proposed a rule that would subject most indexed
annuities to federal securities regulation.141 Previously, the industry had
assumed that these were exclusively insurance products. In proposing the
rule, the SEC noted that individuals who purchase indexed annuities
(frequently, elderly investors looking for a guaranteed return) are exposed to
a significant investment risk—i.e., the volatility of the underlying securities
index, and that purchasers buy indexed annuity contracts for many of the
same reasons that individuals purchase mutual funds and variable annuities
and open brokerage accounts. Hence, the SEC concluded that federal
securities regulation of indexed securities was necessary to protect investors.
The SEC received about 4,800 comments on the proposed rule, principally
letters from the insurance industry opposing the rule.142 I confidently
predicted at a conference I attended in fall 2008 that it would be a long time,
if ever, before the SEC finalized the rule. On the contrary, someone in the
audience told me, the rule would be quickly adopted. Chairman Cox’s
mother had purchased an indexed annuity that he thought was unsuitable for
her needs, he could not resolve the situation to his satisfaction with the
issuer, and he was bound and determined to get this rule passed. Indeed, in
late December, the SEC approved the rule.143 The insurance industry
promptly instituted litigation to challenge the rule, asserting that the Agency
exceeded its power;144 at this time, the future of the rule remains in doubt.
Whatever the outcome, the SEC must continue its responsibility to advance
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the interests of retail investors despite concerted industry opposition.
In conclusion: SEC personnel should act as if they mean it when
they say the Agency is the “investor’s advocate.” Think of every investor as
your mother.
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